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COMMENT 
RIGHTS OF EUROPEAN UNION  
DEPOSITORS UNDER 
ARTICLE  
17 OF THE CHARTER OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AFTER  
THE CYPRUS BAIL-OUT 
Paul Artemou* 
INTRODUCTION 
Banks in the Republic of Cyprus began to deteriorate in 
2010 due to risky investments with Greece.1 The two largest 
Cypriot banks, Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki) and Bank of 
Cyprus (BoC), undertook losses, which made the country 
economically unstable.2 After requesting financial assistance 
from the Eurogroup and International Monetary Fund, there 
was an agreement for Cyprus to raise € 4.2 billion in return for 
a € 10 billion bailout.3 Part of the agreement in raising the 
funds was a levy of bank deposits towards the recapitalization 
needs of the two largest banks.4 
The Cyprus bail-in was unpopular and received much 
criticism because of its unprecedented and seemingly unfair 
condition. In this paper, I will investigate to what extent 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate 2016, Pace University School of Law. 
1 Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, Former Governor, Central 
Bank of Cyprus (Mar. 28, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013 /03/interview-athanasios-
orphanides; The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, at 7 (May 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/20 
13/pdf/ocp149_en.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and troika, 
EKATHIMERINI, Mar. 25, 2013, http://www.ekathimerini.com/ 4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite1 
_1_25/03/2013_489702. 
4 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1. 
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Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (Charter) protects European Union depositors 
from a ‘bail-in’ obligation using Cyprus as a case study. I 
believe that the levying of bank deposits, as a condition of a 
bail-out of Cyprus by the EU did not violate Article 17 of the 
Charter. However, I will argue that while the obligation was 
legal, the European Union should hold a higher standard for 
bank deposits with regard to Article 17 protection because of 
the special nature of bank deposits, and for the preservation of 
confidence in the EU banking system. 
THE ‘CYPRUS BAIL-IN’ 
Cyprus Economic Crisis 
When Cyprus introduced the euro in 2008, the economy 
was thriving, and the island developed into a regional financial 
center.5 However, poor risk management practices, delay 
tactics made by the Cypriot government in the impending 
economic crisis, and excessive concentration of investments in 
Greece contributed to a decline in the sustainability of the 
financial sector.6 
The largest banks in Cyprus are Cyprus Popular Bank 
(Laiki) and The Bank of Cyprus (BoC).7 Laiki and BoC engaged 
in substantial expansions in Greece, specifically in foreign 
sovereign debt, leaving them exposed to the adverse 
macroeconomic developments there.8  The exposure of Laiki 
and BoC to the Greek sovereign debt loan book led to 
increasing levels of non-performing loans within their domestic 
                                                          
5 Id. at 9 (Macroeconomic imbalances included high current account deficits, 
lagging exports, significant losses of price/cost and non-price/cost competitiveness, 
mainly due to wage indexation, delays in the introduction of productivity-and-
competition-enhancing structural reforms and the longer term impact on competitiveness 
and entrepreneurship of an oversized public sector. Strong net inflows of foreign capital 
(mainly deposits) allowed to the current account deficit to grow, while stoking a credit 
boom in the domestic economy. Banks’ credit policy has also been responsible for the 
prevailing imbalances); Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1; 
see also Athanasios Orphanides, What Happened in Cyprus? The Economic 
Consequences of the Last Communist Government in Europe, Special Paper 232, LSE 
Financial Markets Group Special Paper Series, July 2014. 
6 Id. at 11. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 12; see also Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1. 
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portfolios.9 Losses due to these rising non-performing loans10 
mounted up causing negative effects on bank capital.11 
In May 2011, the Cypriot government lost access to the 
international markets, and in October 2011, Laiki Bank and 
BoC, who had major operations in Greece, lost close to € 4.5 
billion after European leaders executed a haircut of Greek 
government bonds.12  Although the Cypriot government tried to 
step in to limit the damage,13 the damage was already 
apparent. That same year, the Cypriot government secured a 
bilateral loan from Russia in the amount of € 2.5 billion with 
4.5% interest to keep the financial sector afloat.14 
The Cypriot authorities formally requested financial 
assistance from the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund on June 25, 2012.15 A joint committee of the 
European Commission, International Monetary Fund, and 
European Central Bank, also known as the Troika, negotiated 
the conditions of the financial assistance.16 An agreement was 
reached on April 2, 2013 on a comprehensive policy package for 
the period 2012-16, supporting financing for a total of € 10 
billion in return for Cyprus raising an expected € 4.2 billion on 
its own.17 On April 24th, Cyprus was granted the financial 
                                                          
9 Id. 
10 See INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nonperformingloan.asp 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2015) (a nonperforming loan is “[a] sum of borrowed money upon 
which the debtor has not made his or her scheduled payments for at least 90 days. A 
nonperforming loan is either in default or close to being in default. Once a loan is 
nonperforming, the odds that it will be repaid in full are considered to be substantially 
lower. If the debtor starts making payments again on a nonperforming loan, it becomes a 
re-performing loan, even if the debtor has not caught up on all the missed payments.”). 
11 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 13. 
12 Telephone Interview with Athanasios Orphanides, supra note 1; see also Stavros 
A. Zenios, Fairness and Reflexivity in the Cyprus Bail-In, WHARTON FIN. INST. CTR. 1, 2 
n.2 (2014), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/14/14-04.pdf (describing that 
European leaders wiped out around 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector 
held. The “private sector involvement” exchanged Greek government bonds (GGB) with 
new long-term GGB and European Stability Fund (EFSF) bonds with a nominal discount 
of around 50% and much higher fair value discount. This took place on July 21 and 
October 26, 2011”). 
13 See The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 Kabir Chibber, Who are the Troika that Greece depends on?, BBC NEWS, Oct. 4, 
2011 http://www.bbc.com/news/business-15149626. 
17 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1; see 
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assistance on the basis of the agreed Memorandum of 
Understanding.18 The Memorandum of Understanding19 
outlined that the funds to be raised by Cyprus would be done 
through a restructuring of BoC and the dissolution of Laiki 
involving levies on bank deposits.20 On April 25th, the Council 
adopted a decision under Article 136 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of Europe21 containing the main elements of the 
macroeconomic adjustment programme to be implemented by 
Cyprus.22 On April 26th, a Memorandum of Understanding, 
consistent with the said-decision, was signed by the Cypriot 
authorities and the Commission. The Cypriot House of 
Representatives endorsed the programme on April 30, 2013.23 
Provisions of the Memorandum of Understanding 
According to the Memorandum of Understanding on 
Specific Economic Policy Conditionality in the Cyprus 
agreement, there are four aspects on the restructuring plan of 
Laiki and BoC.24 
First, there would be an upfront deleveraging of the 
                                                          
Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and Troika, EKATHIMERINI, 
(Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-on-
bailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-and-troika. 
18 Id. 
19 The Memorandum of Understanding describes a binding bilateral or multilateral 
agreement between two or more parties. 
20 Rick Newman, The Cyprus Bailout Does the Unthinkable, Vaporizes Bank 
Deposits, U.S. NEWS, (Mar. 25, 2013, 11:10 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
blogs/rick-newman/2013/03/25/the-cyprus-bailout-does-the-unthinkable-vaporizes-bank-
deposits; see Eurogroup signs off on bailout agreement reached by Cyprus and Troika, 
EKATHIMERINI, (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ekathimerini.com/149669/article/ 
ekathimerini/news/eurogroup-signs-off-on-bailout-agreement-reached-by-cyprus-and-
troika. 
21 See FAQ – Financial Assistance for Cyprus, FINANCIAL STABILITY MECHANISM, at 
4 (May 2013), http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/FAQ%20on%20Cyprus% 
20130520132. 
pdf. 
22 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 37. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. at 39; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality, CYPRUS MINISTRY OF FINANCE at 7, http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/ 
mof.nsf/final%20MOUf.pdf. 
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banks.25 All Greek related assets and liabilities of the two main 
banks were “carved-out” and acquired by the Greek bank 
Piraeus Bank,26 achieving an immediate upfront deleveraging 
while risk-weighted assets declined substantially, thereby 
resulting in a lower capital requirement.27 
Second, there would be an immediate bail-in of some € 1.4 
billion of subordinated debt.28 All insured deposits (deposits 
below €100,000) at Laiki, together with Cypriot and United 
Kingdom assets were moved to BoC.29 Uninsured deposits 
(deposits over €100,000) in Laiki, together with the remaining 
assets and the foreign subsidiaries, remained in the bank and 
were to be liquidated over time.30 Simultaneously, the 
uninsured deposits at the BoC were subject to an immediate 
bail-in of 37.5%, which converted the deposits into Class A 
shares with full voting and dividend rights to provide the 
largest part of the capital needs of the bank.31 Another 22.5% of 
the uninsured deposits were to be frozen to ensure that the 
bank is properly capitalized to the necessary standard.32 
Should the bank turn out to be over-capitalized, the excess will 
be unfrozen and returned to the depositors.33 The resolution of 
Laiki and the consolidation of BoC as the leading Cypriot bank 
resulted in a further immediate deleveraging of the financial 
sector.34 The capital needs of Laiki and of BoC, which together 
totaled about € 10 billion have been covered, exclusively 
through the contributions of uninsured depositors with full 
                                                          
25 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 46. 
26 Id. at 42; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy 
Conditionality, supra note 24, at 8. 
27 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 42. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 42, 73; see also Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic 
Policy Conditionality, supra note 24, at 8. 
31 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74; 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, supra note 
24, at 8. 
32 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74; 
Memorandum of Understanding on Specific Economic Policy Conditionality, supra note 
24, at 8. 
33 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1, at 74. 
34 Id at 42. 
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contribution of equity shareholders and bond holders.35 
Third, BoC and Laiki are subject to an independent 
valuation of their assets, as required by the bank resolution 
framework. This was to see whether the banks were capitalized 
sufficiently and whether more uninsured deposits were to be 
converted.36 
Finally, the Cyprus Central Bank appoints a new Board of 
Directors and an acting Chief Executive Officer until Bank of 
Cyprus’ new shareholders are organized in a general meeting. 
The Board of Directors is responsible to restructure a plan 
defining the bank’s business objectives and credit policies.37 
DEPOSITOR’S RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
General 
The relationship between the banker and the customer is 
generally a contractual one.  When a deposit account is opened 
at a depositary institution, the relationship between the bank 
and the customer is governed by the contract between the 
customer and the institution and by applicable statutes and 
regulations.38 Essentially, the bank owes the customer the 
money,  therefore making the bank a debtor of the customer.39 
The bank is obligated to follow the customer’s instructions 
and is considered as an agent of the customer. However, a bank 
generally does not owe its customer any fiduciary duties, yet 
this fiduciary duty may be created in some situations.40 Banks 
generally have a duty to act in good faith and use ordinary care 
while dealing with their customers under common law.41 
The terms and conditions in Cypriot commercial banks 
may include provisions such as; availability of banking 
facilities and services, customer’s instructions to the bank, 
customer privacy, expenses, fiduciary deposits, fees and other 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 74-75. 
37 Id. 
38 MARK BUDNITZ ET AL., CONSUMER BANKING AND PAYMENTS LAW 14 (5th ed. 2013). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. It is important to note that Cyprus follows English common law. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5
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administrative provisions.42 
Banking general terms and conditions generally have 
provisions that authorize deposits held in the name of the 
customer with the bank to be used as fiduciary deposits.43 
Fiduciary deposits allow the bank to make deposits in any 
banking institution, in the Bank’s name, but for the account 
and at the risk of the customer.44 Customers also generally 
agree that the bank will not be liable for any losses based on 
placement of deposit., The customer bears the risk of any 
default by the bank and for any losses resulting from or related 
to any such default or any acts or omissions of the bank in 
relation to the making, maintenance and management of the 
fiduciary deposits and their value or the fluctuation of such 
value or any other matters pertaining to the fiduciary 
deposits.45 
Furthermore, most terms and conditions contain a force 
majeure clause which states that the bank will not be liable for 
damages caused as a result of its services being suspended due 
to the actions of any authority, Cypriot or foreign, strike, lock 
out, force majeure or any other reasons not proved to be a 
willful act by the Bank. The same applies in the event that 
there is material cause for the Bank to suspend or limit, 
completely or partially, its services for certain days or for a 
certain time.46 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes 
Cyprus created The Cyprus Deposit Protection and 
Resolution of Credit and Other Institutions Scheme (Deposit 
Protection Scheme) which insures depositors up to € 100,000 in 
the event banks become insolvent.47  The European Union 
                                                          
42 General Terms and Conditions, Laiki Bank, Nov. 2012 (11th Ed.). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at art. 25, § 5. 
46 Id. 
47 Informative Leaflet Addressed to the Covered Institution’s Depositors on the 
Protection Afforded to them by the Cyprus Deposit Protection and Resolution of Credit 
and other Institutions Scheme, BANK OF CYPRUS 1, 2 (2013), 
http://www.bankofcyprus.com.cy/Documents/Cyprus/Org_Methods/Banking_Codes_Sch
emes/Eng/10-0489E.pdf [hereinafter Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the 
Protection]. 
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established Directive 94/19/EC,48 which all Members of the 
European Economic Area49 are required to follow.50 The 
purpose of the Deposit Protection Scheme is to compensate 
depositors of covered institutions, which pay contributions to 
the respective deposit protection funds, in the event that a 
covered institution is unable to repay its depositors.51 On the 
other hand, it may be the funding of the implementation of 
resolution measures.52 
The Deposit Protection Scheme covers all types of deposits 
belonging to physical or legal persons, denominated in all 
currencies.53 Participation in the Deposit Protection Scheme is 
compulsory for all banks and licensed credit institutions in 
Cyprus.54 Therefore, BoC and Laiki Banks were institutions 
that participated in the Deposit Protection Scheme.55 
The Deposit Protection Scheme becomes activated if it is 
determined that a particular credit institution is unable to 
repay its deposits.56 The amount of each depositor’s existing 
deposits are set off against any loans or other credit facilities 
granted by the covered institution to the depositor, as well as 
any other counterclaim of the bank in respect of which a right 
to set off exists.57 
Position of Bank Deposits After Cyprus Bail-In 
                                                          
48 Council Directive 94/19, 1994 O.J. (L 135) 5 (EC.). 
49 The European Economic Area (EEA) unites the EU Member States and the three 
EEA EFTA States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) into an Internal Market governed 
by the same basic rules. 
50 “The provision of deposit insurance in the EU (and also in the three EFTA states 
that along with the EU nations make up the EEA) is governed by Directive 94/19/EC as 
amended by 20009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 
2009. Directives are legislative acts that specify a result that Member States must 
achieve, leaving the form and method up to the Member States. This directive requires 
that Member States are to have and monitor a deposit guarantee scheme that protects 
most depositors up to € 100,000.”  Anne Sibert, Deposit Insurance after Iceland and 
Cyprus, VOX (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/deposit-insurance-after-
iceland-and-cyprus. 
51  Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47. 
52 General Terms and Conditions, Laiki Bank, supra note 42. 
53 Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Informative Leaflet on Depositors on the Protection, supra note 47, at 1. 
57 Id. 
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Members of the European Economic Area, which include 
the EU, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, are required to set 
up deposit-insurance schemes that cover most depositors up to 
100,000 €.58 In a ruling by the European Free Trade 
Association59 against Iceland (the “IceSave case”), the court 
made clear that the deposit protection scheme directive is 
meant to cover the failure of individual banks, not a systemic 
crisis. In the event of a sufficiently large banking crisis, 
depositors may ultimately be protected only up to the ability 
and willingness of the sovereign nation to step in with the 
necessary funds.60 
The Cyprus bail-out has shed even further light at to the 
position of deposits during a systemic banking crisis.  It 
appears that after the Cyprus bail-in, bank deposits, including 
insured deposits are not completely safe in the European Union 
in the event that a country requires a ‘bail-out’ or 
recapitalization. The situation in Cyprus was highly unusual 
because the Cypriot government was reported to agree to the 
terms of the ‘bail-in’ and may have even suggested coming up 
with domestic funds to satisfy the Troika and avert an 
economic crisis.61 However, I believe that every financial crisis 
is handled urgently and the specific situation that Cyprus 
found itself in should not be considered to a great extent. I 
believe that the Cyprus bail-in supported the principle 
established in the IceSave case because the deposit protection 
scheme directive is meant to cover the failure of an individual 
bank, and not a systemic crisis. 
The IceSave case and the Cyprus events tend to imply that 
it is generally accepted that shareholders and depositors 
should take losses in the event of a systemic bank failure. The 
                                                          
58 Id. 
59See THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, http://www.efta.int/about-
efta/european-free-trade-association (last visited Oct. 22, 2015) (noting that the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an intergovernmental organization that promotes free 
trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States, and that the 
European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement, enables three of the four EFTA Member 
States (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) to participate in the EU’s Internal Market).  
60 Case E-16/11, Judgment, (Jan. 28 2013), http://www.eftacourt.int/fileadmin/ 
user_upload/Files/News/2013/16_11_Judgment.pdf. 
61 Deposit Guarantee Schemes, EUR. PARL. DOC. (2013), http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/ 
9634/1/20130703ATT69107EN.pdf. 
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Deposit Protection Scheme is only seen as insurance for ‘small 
crises,’ such as the failure of an individual or particular bank.62 
However, one questions the fate of unsecured creditors, such as 
uninsured bank depositors.63 It appears that uninsured 
depositors in European banks may not be spared in the event 
the sovereign is in need of a recapitalization of its banks.64 
Whether the ‘bail-in’ method is used in future economic crises 
will remain to be seen. 
It is important to note that the Court of Justice by the EU 
has not reviewed the ruling towards Iceland.65  Iceland is not a 
member of the European Union and is not subject to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. So, 
although there appears to be newly established precedent in 
the EU with respect to deposit protection, I do not believe the 
IceSave case gives full justification for what occurred in 
Cyprus. 
ARTICLE 17 OF THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Background 
Article 17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union states: 
1. Everyone has the right to own, use dispose of and 
bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may 
be deprived of his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one 
may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the public 
interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for 
by law, subject to fair compensation being paid in good time for 
their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so 
far as is necessary for the general interest. 
2. Intellectual Property shall be protected.66 
                                                          
62 Anne Sibert, Deposit Insurance after Iceland and Cyprus, VOX (Apr. 2, 2013), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/deposit-insurance-after-iceland-and-cyprus. 
63 Id. 
64 See Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, Did Cyprus Set A Dangerous Precedent?, RHODIUM 
GROUP (Mar. 29, 2013), http://rhg.com/notes/did-cyprus-set-a-dangerous-precedent. 
65 Id. 
66  THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY at 465 (Steve Peers, 
Tamara Hervey, Jeff Kenner & Angela Ward eds., 2014) [hereinafter Peers EU Charter 
Commentary]. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5
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Article 17 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (Charter) is based on Article 1 of the Protocol to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR),67 enacted in Paris in 1952.68 
Article 52(3)69 of the Charter applies requiring interpreting the 
meaning and scope of Article 17 in line with Article 1 of the 
Additional Protocol to the ECHR. Nonetheless, the Charter 
may provide more extensive protection.70 
The right to property has been recognized as a 
fundamental constitutional right in all Member States of the 
EU.71 The judgment Nold (1974) implies recognition of the 
right to property as a fundamental right.72 It also stressed that 
it would be legitimate to set up certain limits to these rights, 
justified by goals of general interest pursued by the 
Community, provided that the substance of these rights was 
not affected.73 
The first judgment dealing with an alleged violation of the 
right to property was in case Hauer (1979), which held that the 
right to property was guaranteed by common constitutional 
concepts of the Member States, which were also reflected in the 
Additional protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
                                                          
67  Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, March 20, 1952, Europ. T.S. No. 009 [Protocol No. 1] (“Every natural or legal 
person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived 
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall 
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems 
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to 
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”). 
68  Commentary on the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, at 
163, (June 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/networkcommentaryfinal_en.pdf. [hereinafter EU Network of Independent 
Experts Commentary]. 
69  Article 52(3) of The European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights reads: “In 
so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. 
This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” 2000 
J.O. (C 364) 1. [hereinafter Charter of Fundamental Rights]. 
70  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 469. 
71  Id. 
72  Case C-4/73, Nold v. Comm’n, 1974 E.C.R. 491. 
73  Id. 
11
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Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.74 The Court made 
a distinction between measures to the deprivation of property 
and to the restriction on the use of property.75 Although the 
European Community could not be prevented from a possibility 
to control or restrict the use of property in a context of common 
market regulation, the Court ruled that the restriction had to 
correspond to the general interest and must not be 
disproportionate interference for the rights of owner.76 
Right to Property 
Article 17(1) sentence 1 limits the right to property to 
lawfully acquired possessions.77 The right to property may be 
claimed by natural as well as legal persons but not by public 
law bodies nor for public undertakings.78 Also, property extends 
to all pecuniary interests assigned to the individual in their 
private interest and as an exclusive entitlement.79  Property is 
defined as ‘rights with an asset value creating an established 
legal position under the legal system, enabling the holder to 
exercise those rights autonomously and for his benefit.’80 
Lastly, the right to property covers not only moveable and 
immovable property but also immaterial positions including 
claims of an economic value, rights of usufruct, liens, company 
shares or intellectual property rights.81 
As a general rule, the right to property gives protection 
only to an existing possession.82 However, there are exceptions 
when certain conditions are met. The European Court of 
Human Rights has accorded such protection to applicants 
having a “legitimate expectation” of collecting an asset, 
otherwise known as a receivable.83 However, the notion of a 
“legitimate expectation” is limited, because Article 1 of the 
                                                          
74  Case C-44/79, Hauer v. Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. 
77  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 473. 
78  Id. 
79  Id at 472. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. 
82  Id. 
83  EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 165. 
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Protocol does not provide a right to become an owner (i.e. to 
acquire ownership).84 Therefore, “legitimate expectation” must 
be of a nature more concrete than of “hope” and be based on a 
legal provision or a legal act such as a judicial decision.85  
However, if the person has effectively waived their right to 
property by explicit and voluntary consent in full awareness of 
the circumstances, than there is no deemed interference with 
property.86 
A reasonable application of the elements of Article 17 to 
the Cyprus bail-out generates the conclusion that bank 
deposits are considered to be existing, lawfully acquired 
property.87  Applying the elements of Article 17(1) sentence 1 to 
the facts, we certainly have a situation where the property 
owners, i.e. bank depositors, have a right “to own, use, dispose 
of and bequeath his or her lawfully acquired possession.”  Bank 
deposits are considered existing property under the ECHR 
because they are “rights with an asset value creating an 
established legal position under the legal system, enabling the 
holder to exercise those rights autonomously and for his 
benefit.”88  Bank deposits are assets that have value through 
the currency they represent, and have an established legal 
position under the legal and monetary system. The holder may 
do as they wish with their currency such as  deposit, withdraw, 
or invest. 
Furthermore, the Cyprus bail-in obligation was not a 
situation where deposit holders effectively waived their right to 
property. Effectively waiving one’s right to property requires 
an explicit and voluntary consent in full awareness of the 
circumstances.89 In the case of Cypriot deposit holders, they 
had no choice as to what happened to their deposits because 
capital controls were put in place by the Cypriot government, 
                                                          
84  Id. 
85  EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 476. 
86  Id. 
87  Note that there has been some speculation that a majority of the uninsured 
deposits in the Laiki Bank were from Russian money launderers. However, this remains 
to be merely speculation. Svetlana Ledyaeva et al. Cyprus, corruption, money laundering 
and Russian round-trip investment, VOX (June 17, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org 
/article/russian-cyprus-round-tripping-corruption-linked-money-laundering. 
88  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 472. 
89  Id. 
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which prevented withdrawals or transfers of their deposits 
before and after the bail-in occurred.90 Additionally, the Cypriot 
government had imposed a bank holiday during the 
negotiations as well as during the implementation of the 
conditions.91 Shortly after the conditions were implemented, 
depositors were restricted in the amount of money they could 
withdraw.92  Even if the option to withdraw money from the 
banks were feasible, depositors had no control over the 
agreement Cyprus would implement as a result of the 
discussions with the Troika. Although the Cypriot parliament 
agreed to the terms of the bail-out, no vote occurred among 
depositors which would constitute explicit and voluntary 
consent and thus a waiver of the right to property under Article 
17 of the Charter. 
Deprivation of Property 
Article 17(1) of the Charter distinguishes between two 
specific categories of limitations and derogations: deprivation of 
possessions and regulations of the use of property.  
“Deprivation of property means a formal expropriation which 
may be based on legislative acts or measures implementing 
them, i.e. a measure completely and permanently depriving the 
owner of their property.”93 One must look to the aim of the 
measure in distinguishing measures regulating the use of 
property from those depriving a person of their possessions.94 
“A regulation of the use of property does not constitute a 
deprivation if the owner of the property remains free to dispose 
of it or to put it to other uses which are not prohibited.”‘95  
“According to jurisprudence of the Court, a deprivation of 
possessions requires not only that a person is deprived of their 
property, but also that the latter is transferred to another 
person.”96 
                                                          
90  Cyprus eurozone bailout prompts anger as savers hand over possible 10% levy, 
REINFORM, http://www.reinform.nl/?p=5333 [hereinafter Reinform]. 
91  Id. 
92  Id. 
93  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 478. 
94  Id. 
95  Id 
96  Id. 
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“Deprivation of property covers both de facto deprivation 
as well as formal deprivation.”97 A formal deprivation is a 
transfer of ownership based on a legal procedure, whereas a de 
facto deprivation is not.98  “In assessing both forms of 
interference with property, the ECHR attempts to strike a fair 
balance between the right of the individual and the general 
interest of the community.”99 
“Article 17(1) sentence 2 sets up three requirements 
necessary to justify a deprivation of possessions.”100  First, the 
deprivation of property, “must be based on a sufficiently precise 
and accessible legal basis regulating the conditions and 
modalities.”101 “Second, the deprivation of possessions must be 
in the public interest.”102  However, “if the underlying 
objectives are disproportionate in view of the right to property”, 
then there can be no deprivation.103  “Third, a fair 
compensation for the loss must be paid in good time.”104 A fair 
compensation must be calculated on the basis of the current 
market value.105  However, exceptional considerations of public 
interest, such as the realization of fundamental institutional or 
economic reforms or of measures to promote social justice, may 
justify a deviation from the full market value.106 
The notion of public interest is extensive. The ECHR found 
that with respect to the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘in 
the public interest,’ the margin of appreciation available to the 
legislature in implementing social and economic policies should 
be wide,  unless that judgment is manifestly without 
reasonable foundation.107 The concept of reasonable foundation 
means the Court seeks to find a fair balance or a 
                                                          
97  EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166. 
98  Control of Use and Deprivation of Property, ECHR-ONLINE.INFO; http://echr-
online.info/right-to-property-article-1-of-protocol-1-to-the-echr/control-of-use-and-
deprivation-of-property/.  
99   Id. 
100  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 479. 
101   Id. 
102  Id. at 480; see also EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra 
note 68, at 166. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 480. 
106  EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166. 
107  Id.  
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proportionality between the interest of the community and the 
individual right to property.108 
When assessing the market value, all circumstances of the 
particular case have to be taken into account. One must look at 
factors relevant for determining the market value and rules 
exclusively privileging the state. One relevant factor would be 
an irrebuttable presumption that the value of the property 
increased.109 
In view of the requirements to pay compensation in good 
time and to base expropriations on an adequate legal basis, a 
rule determining the amount and the modalities of 
compensation has to be set up in advance.  Otherwise, the 
deprivation of possessions is illegal. “This applies to formal as 
well as to de facto expropriations.”110 
Compensation following a deprivation of property is also 
linked to the notion of “reasonableness.”111 The level of 
compensation is a material factor in assessing 
proportionality.112 While compensation is necessary in the 
taking of property with an amount reasonably related to the 
value of the property, public interest considerations may 
permit reimbursement of less than the full market value.113 A 
total lack of compensation could be justified only in exceptional 
circumstances.114 
Applying the three requirements of Article 17(1) sentence 2 
to the conditions of the Cyprus bail-in, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether there was a deprivation of property. I believe the 
uninsured bank deposits that remained in Laiki, that were to 
stay in the bank, and are to be repaid back to depositors 
through liquidation over time may consist of a deprivation of 
property. Since the depositors may stand to lose around 80% of 
their deposits as a result of the Troika designating Laiki to be 
                                                          
108  Id. 
109  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481. 
110  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481; see also EU Network of 
Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166. 
111  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481. 
112  Id. 
113  Id. 
114  Id. 
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the “bad bank” over BoC.115 Thus, the potential 80% of deposits 
that may never be returned may be deemed a deprivation of 
property under Article 17. 
The first requirement under Article 17 is that a 
deprivation of property must be based on a sufficiently precise 
and accessible legal basis regulating the conditions and 
modalities.116  The Troika relied on Article 136 of the Treaty of 
the Functioning of Europe to impose conditions on Cyprus.  
Article 136 of the Treaty of the Functioning of Europe reads: 
1. In order to ensure the proper functioning of economic 
and monetary union, and in accordance with the relevant 
provisions of the Treaties, the Council shall, in accordance with 
the relevant procedure from among those referred to in Articles 
121 and 126, with the exception of the procedure set out in 
Article 126(14), adopt measures specific to those Member 
States whose currency is the euro: 
(a) to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of their 
budgetary discipline; 
(b) to set out economic policy guidelines for them, while 
ensuring that they are compatible with those adopted for the 
whole of the Union and are kept under surveillance. 
2. For those measures set out in paragraph 1, only 
members of the Council representing Member States whose 
currency is the euro shall take part in the vote. A qualified 
majority of the said members shall be defined in accordance 
with Article 238(3)(a).117 
C 326/106 EN Official Journal of the European Union 
26.10.2012 Based on Article 136 of the Treaty of the 
Functioning of Europe, The Troika had the legal basis to place 
conditions on Cyprus that “strengthen the coordination and 
surveillance of their budgetary discipline” and set out economic 
policy guidelines.118 Therefore, it is clear that the Troika had a 
                                                          
115 Cyprus Finance Minister: Uninsured Laiki Depositors Could Face 80% Haircut, 
GREEK REPORTER, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/03/27/cyprus-finance-minister-
uninsured-laiki-depositors-could-face-80-haircut/#sthash.PxHBmIdV.dpuf. 
116  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 479. 
117  Consolidated Version of The Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 
art. 136, 2012 O.J. 326/ 47, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN. 
118 Id. at 106. 
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legal basis to be able to impose some sort of economic 
regulation and condition based on the Cyprus financial crisis. 
The second requirement, that deprivation of possessions 
must be in the public interest, was arguably met in this 
situation with regard to the potentially “lost” uninsured bank 
deposits that were to remain in Laiki. The deteriorated 
macroeconomic conditions and the lack of bank capital in Laiki 
and BoC meant that Cyprus had to come up with some sort of 
bailout measure quickly in order for the banking sector to 
function again. Essentially, there may not have been much of a 
choice in how they could respond. The stability and health of 
Cyprus’ economy is clearly a matter of public interest which 
would satisfy this prong of Article 17(1). 
When considering whether a deprivation of property was 
justified because of the public interest, one must analyze 
whether the underlying objectives were disproportionate in 
view of the right to property.119 In this case, the underlying 
objective was to restore the soundness of Cyprus’ financial 
sector and restore confidence in the banking industry. If 
Cypriot leaders felt that they had no choice but to concede to 
the Troika’s demand in levying bank deposits or else face a 
systemic collapse in Cyprus, then I believe the underlying 
objective was not disproportionate in view of the right to 
property. 
The third requirement, that fair compensation for the loss 
be paid in good time, was also met in this situation. Based on 
the restructuring plan outlined in the Memorandum of 
Understanding, all insured deposits at Laiki were moved to 
BoC. For these deposits, there was arguably no deprivation of 
property because the depositors still hold their property in a 
different bank. Furthermore, the 37.5% of uninsured deposits 
at BOC that were converted to shares in the bank do not 
require any compensation because depositors still own the full 
value of their property in a different form. However, it is still 
uncertain as to whether the depositors with new shares in BoC 
may be able to sell their shares at the same market value that 
they held their deposits. 
With regard to the uninsured deposits in Laiki which were 
                                                          
119  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 480. 
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to remain in the bank to be liquidated over time, the situation 
is more complex. As bank depositor, there will always be the 
risk that your deposits will be lost in the event of a bank or 
system failure. As a depositor, one is taking a risk when 
putting assets into a bank. Banks have deposit insurance 
schemes to cover depositors up to a specified amount in the 
event the bank fails. Therefore, if Laiki is considered a failed 
bank, and Laiki depositors are losing their uninsured portion of 
their deposits, then there may be no deprivation of property in 
this situation since the depositors assumed the risk in the first 
place. Losing your uninsured deposits to a failed bank is a 
foreseeable result, however unlikely. As mentioned, depositors 
will only be entitled to the insured amounts of their deposits 
during a bank failure, and can expect lose all of their deposits 
in the case of a financial system crisis. 
On the other hand, it was the Troika who designated Laiki 
to become the “bad bank”, i.e. the bank that would be 
liquidated while its insured deposits get transferred to the 
“good bank.” Since Laiki is a failed bank as a result of a 
government regulation, it is difficult to accept that the same 
standard of risk of bank failure for bank depositors applies. 
Rather, it seems that the regulation directly caused a 
deprivation of property and should be subject to the protection 
of Article 17. However, it is also possible that Laiki would have 
inevitably failed if there was no regulation in the first place. 
The possibility of any other actions taken by the Cypriot 
government are speculative. 
Furthermore, many of the uninsured Laiki depositors 
stand to lose over 80% of their uninsured deposits since the 
liquidation may prove insufficient in repaying the depositors in 
full.120  If a European court holds that such losses are to be 
considered a deprivation of property under Article 17 of the 
Charter, then they are subject to “fair compensation being paid 
in good time for their loss.” 
Since the uninsured depositors in Laiki deserve “fair 
compensation in good time for their loss,” the measures in place 
may not meet the obligation of Article 17 by the Troika. 
                                                          
120 Cyprus Finance Minister: Uninsured Laiki Depositors Could Face 80% Haircut, 
GREEK REPORTER, http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/03/27/cyprus-finance-minister-
uninsured-laiki-depositors-could-face-80-haircut/#sthash.PxHBmIdV.dpuf. 
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However, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that 
“public interest considerations, including measures designed to 
achieve greater social justice, may permit reimbursement of 
less than the full market value.”121  Furthermore, the Court has 
also ruled that “a total lack of compensation could be justified 
only in exceptional circumstances.”122 
In consideration of the Court’s ruling that greater social 
justice may permit reimbursement of less than full market 
value, the uninsured Laiki depositors may legally receive less 
than their full uninsured deposits. However, it is unclear how 
much less than fair market value is acceptable. Potentially 
losing 80% of uninsured deposits, especially when dealing with 
uninsured deposits in the millions, could be extreme. Also, the 
Court is unclear as to what exceptional circumstances would 
justify a total lack of compensation. 
Regulations of the Use of Property 
“Article 17(1) sentence 3 of the Charter permits 
regulations of the use of the right to property where they are 
provided for by law and necessary for the general interest.”123 
“The legal basis must be. . .precise [and] the requirement of 
necessity has to be interpreted in. . .light of the 
jurisprudence.”124 “A regulation of the use of property has to 
meet the ‘proportionality test’, and ‘respect.’” Respect is the 
essence of the right to property.125 
“The test of proportionality is based on a four-step 
approach: [(1)] the legitimate objective, [(2)] appropriateness 
(suitability), [(3)] necessity[,] and [(4)] proportionality. . .of the 
measure in view of the aims pursued [to] have to be scrutinized 
strictu sensu.”126 “In its jurisprudence, the ECJ. . .does not 
clearly distinguish these steps. . .”127 
“An objective is legitimate if it serves the public good or the 
                                                          
121  EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166. 
122  Id. 
123  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481. 
124  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66. 
125  Id. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5
5  PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:53 AM 
2016] RIGHTS OF EU DEPOSITORS IN CYPRUS 225 
protection of rights and freedoms of other persons.”128 [These] 
objectives may be derived from the general or particular aims 
of the [European] Union, from the grounds for justification 
established in the context of the fundamental freedoms[,] and 
from international obligations. . .”129 
Next, the measure must be factually suitable to meet the 
objective pursued (contribute to their achievement), and 
necessary. “[‘Necessity’] requires that when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures, the least onerous 
measure must be used.”130 
“[Lastly], a measure is proportionate strictu sensu if the 
conflicting interest has been balanced fairly: The interests 
involved must be weighed having regard to all the 
circumstances of the case in order to determine whether a fair 
balance was struck between those interests.”131 
The second aspect of the regulation of the use of property 
involves “respect.” In other words, one must look at the essence 
of the right to property. The guarantee of the essential content 
of a right, as distinguished from the proportionality test, 
constitutes an ultimate threshold. “The essence of the right to 
property is disrespected when the guarantee of property is 
deprived of its substance, but not when affected only 
marginally or when only modalities of its exercise are 
regulated.”132 
“The notion of ‘general interest’. . .contains [two] 
value[s].”133  On the one hand, the “general interest” is 
connected to entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, it 
can be connected to values of social-economic nature.134 “The 
prevalence of social aspects in the notion of ‘general interest’ 
requires that the right to property be subordinate to the aims of 
public utility, coinciding with equal relations or with the social 
                                                          
128  Id. at 482. 
129  Id. 
130  Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 482. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 485. 
133 WILLIAM B.T. MOCK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE: COMMENTARY ON THE 
CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 108 (William B.T. Mock et 
al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Human Rights in Europe Commentary]. 
134  Id. 
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role.”135 
The third rule includes the right of the state to control the 
use of property.136 It includes the right of the state to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.137 The use 
of property is a more general term which seems to cover 
various kinds of interference with property.138 It is frequently 
disputed whether there has been a “deprivation of possessions” 
(second rule) or a “control of use of property” (third rule), as the 
former requires greater justification than the latter.139 The 
state is free to take measures “as it deems necessary”. The 
review by the ECHR limits itself on the issues of legality and 
purpose.140 
I believe that the insured Laiki deposits and the uninsured 
BOC deposits turned equity are regulations of the use of 
property under sentence 3 of Article 17. Based on Article 17, 
the Cypriot government as well as the Troika were permitted 
to regulate the use of property by law in so far as is necessary 
for the general interest. 
Based on ECHR jurisprudence, a regulation of the use of 
property has to meet the proportionality test, and respect, i.e. 
the essence of the right to property.141 The test of 
proportionality is based on a four step approach, (1) the 
legitimate objective, (2) appropriateness (suitability), (3) 
necessity, and (4) proportionality of the measure in view of the 
aims pursued to have to be scrutinized strictu sensu.142  In its 
jurisprudence, the ECJ does not clearly distinguish these 
steps.143 
Restoring the soundness of the Cypriot banking sector and 
rebuilding depositors’ and market confidence is clearly a 
legitimate objective.  There is virtually no argument that if 
Cyprus had not acted quickly on finding a solution, the country 
                                                          
135  Id. 
136  EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 66, at 167. 
137  Id. 
138  Id. 
139  Human Rights in Europe Commentary, supra note 133, at 108. 
140  Id. at 167. 
141  See EU Network of Independent Experts Commentary, supra note 68, at 166. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
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would have been in utter turmoil.144 The implementation of 
these conditions were necessary and appropriate because 
Cyprus had no other option than to agree to the terms of the 
Troika or risk the demise of the country’s economy and 
financial sector. 
Here the proportionality of the measure in view of the aims 
pursued would pass stricto sensu scrutiny.145 Stricto sensu 
scrutiny requires that “[t]he interests involved must be 
weighed having regard to all the circumstances of the case in 
order to determine whether a fair balance was struck between 
those interests.”146 Here, there is arguably a balance of the 
conflicting interests; the conditions imposed in the Cyprus bail-
out allowed Cyprus to raise the capital required to finance the 
BoC to meet the criteria for a € 10 billion bail-out from the 
Troika.147 At the same time, a majority of Cypriot depositors 
still had possession of their property through ownership of BoC 
shares. Additionally, uninsured depositors in either bank were 
not deprived of any property at all..148  However, there is a 
questionable deprivation of property for uninsured depositors 
of Laiki since their compensation depends on the liquidation of 
the bank.149 Overall, the bail-in measures satisfied the Troika’s 
requests while not severely impacting a majority of the 
depositors in the long run. 
The second aspect of the regulation of the use of property 
involves ‘respect.’150 In this test, the essence of the right to 
property is disrespected when the guarantee of property is 
deprived of its substance, but not when affected only 
marginally or when only modalities of its exercise are 
regulated.151 In the case of the Cyprus, I would argue that the 
guarantee of property was affected marginally and that 
                                                          
144 See EU finance ministers approve Cyprus bailout deal, USA TODAY (Mar. 25, 
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2013/03/24/cyprus-eu-bailout-
brussels/ 2014545/; see also Cypriot President says he was forced to accept EU 
bailout, EURACTIV.COM (Mar. 18, 2013),  http://beta.euractiv.com/section/euro-
finance/news/ cypriot -president-says-he-was-forced-to-accept-eu-bailout/. 
145  See Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 482. 
146  Id. 
147  The Economic Adjustment Programme for Cyprus, supra note 1. 
148  See id. 
149  Id. 
150 See Peers EU Charter Commentary, supra note 66, at 481.  
151 Id. at 485. 
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modalities of its exercise were regulated. Thus, the conditions 
imposed on Cypriot depositors passed this test of ‘respect.’ 
In regards to the notion of ‘general interest’ under the 
Article, it is clear that the conditions imposed were for the 
‘general interest’ of the public. It is in the general interest for 
Cyprus to make sure both of its largest banks do not fail 
leaving the country in financial ruin and despair. 
One may argue that the deposits transferred into equity 
should not fall under the scrutiny of Article 17 at all because as 
new shareholders of BoC, they can simply sell their shares and 
receive their fair market value just as if they withdrew that 
money from the bank. However, I would still consider this to be 
a regulation by law since it was by regulation that their 
deposits were converted into equity. The conversion of deposits 
into equity as a legal regulation places it under the scrutiny of 
Article 17 of the Charter. Therefore, I believe that the terms of 
the Memorandum of Understanding did not violate Article 17, 
sentence 3 of the Charter. 
BANK DEPOSITS DESERVE A HIGHER STANDARD UNDER 
ARTICLE 17  
The obligation imposed on Cyprus to levy bank deposits in 
return for a bailout was largely unpopular and unprecedented.  
My concern with this type of bail-out obligation is the 
deterioration of confidence in the banking system of not only 
Cyprus, but for the European Union as a whole.  Although only 
uninsured deposits were materially affected by these 
obligations, bank consumers may not feel safe knowing that 
there is a risk that any portion of their deposits may be lost 
during an economic crisis. 
I believe that European courts should hold a higher 
standard for bank deposits as a form of property in regard to 
Article 17 for two reasons: (1) the special nature of bank 
deposits; and (2) for maintaining confidence in the EU banking 
system.  In keeping these aspects into consideration, the 
appropriate body of the European Union should hold that the 
levying of bank deposits should not be allowed unless all other 
reasonable options have been frustrated, thus leaving a higher 
standard in the regulation of bank deposits for the general 
interest according to Article 17. 
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Special Nature of Bank Deposits 
Various theories arise as to why property in general should 
be protected. Modern philosophers such as David Hume and 
John Locke make reference to an unattractive state of nature 
where property was not protected, and violence among 
humanity without such protection was imminent.152  The 
protection of property is a social construct and for good reason. 
The protection of property brings social order that benefits 
everyone in society. Each member of society knows that there 
are rules that protect their claim to property and do not have to 
fend anyone off to maintain it. However, there are also 
situations where society will accept the deprivation or 
regulation of property when it is for the public good. 
The Cyprus bail-out brings into question whether the 
government can pass a regulation whereby bank deposits can 
be levied (both insured and uninsured) for the general interest. 
Although bank deposits are property, most depositors are 
aware of losing that property when there is a risk of a bank 
failing 
However, I believe that bank deposits have a profound 
meaning to our daily lives and deserve special treatment. 
People are not expected to stuff their income under their 
mattresses; rather, they deposit their income in banks. People 
deposit their money into banks is because they believe it is 
safe. Banks have a systematic way to keep deposits safe from 
fire, theft, and other casualties. Furthermore, people put their 
money in banks because deposited funds often grow with 
interest. The interest the bank pays to people for keeping their 
money in the bank comes from interest that other people pay to 
the bank in exchange for being allowed to borrow money.153 
Deposits in the banking system are crucial for the growth 
of the capitalist economy.154 Money that is deposited is used by 
banks for investments that help grow the economy. For 
                                                          
152  STEPHAN BUCKLE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF PROPERTY 234 (1991). 
153Deposit Interest Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/d/deposit-interest-rate.asp. 
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example, a bank may take 90% of the money deposited by a 
particular individual and use that money to make other 
investments, such as bank loans to other consumers. Loans by 
banks to businesses and other consumers increase consumption 
in the economy, which in turn increases GDP.155 Therefore, 
deposits have become an effective and major factor in economic 
growth. 
Another reason why deposits deserve a higher standard is 
because the bank depositor should not be expected to know if a 
bank is financially solid.  A bank depositor expects their 
deposits to be untouched, even in the case of an economic crisis. 
A bank depositor puts their trust in the banks and the 
government to find a solution to an economic crisis without 
their deposits being lost. 
Furthermore, the bank depositor has the ‘legitimate 
expectation’ to collect their deposits. As discussed, ‘legitimate 
expectation’ must be of a nature more concrete than of ‘hope’ 
and be based on a legal provision or a legal act such as a 
judicial decision.156 Depositors do not ‘hope’ that they will be 
able to withdraw their deposits at any time. They expect to 
withdraw their deposits at any time they wish without any 
resistance from the bank or the government. By levying bank 
deposits in the form of a regulation, the European Union has 
diminished this ‘legitimate expectation’ which is recognized by 
law to be sacrosanct. 
Although banks are considered businesses that are 
dedicated to making a profit in uncertain markets, I do not 
believe that society should be unconditionally responsible for 
having to make banking decisions and be responsible for those 
decisions. While banks are businesses, they should still be 
treated as public institutions because of the amount of trust 
that patrons put into them, as well as their significance in 
maintaining the global economy. 
Confidence in the EU Banking System 
Consumer banking is a system that is essentially based on 
trust. A person walks into a bank and deposits his income. The 
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layman is voluntarily giving his property to the bank to hold 
for him on the expectation that when he requests his money 
again, he will be given the full value of his deposit. This person 
most likely does not have any personal relationship to the 
managers, tellers, or even executives but he will expect the 
bank to hold his deposits safe in their care.  In essence, there is 
a level of trust and confidence that keeps the banking system 
functioning. Without this trust, there is much uncertainty in 
how depositors will react in times of crisis. If depositors lose 
confidence in the bank’s soundness, they may withdraw their 
funds not only from that bank but from other perfectly sound 
banks turning banks insolvent and causing an economic 
disaster. 
Furthermore, when government intervenes and 
manipulates the validity of that trust, then this can have dire 
consequences.  That government has essentially manipulated 
and tarnished the basis of the principles of capitalism and that 
level of trust that consumers have in the system. The consumer 
will think twice before putting his money in a bank where that 
government has acted. 
Cyprus was an island in which a majority amount of its 
GDP was based on financial services. The fact that the Cypriot 
government may take your deposits in the future is a 
possibility that will make depositors feel uneasy. If the Troika 
can impose such obligations on Cyprus, an EU member, it may 
do so to any member. This may include other troubled 
countries such as Spain, Italy, Ireland, and Greece. Depositors 
in those countries may want to pull their deposits out which 
can cause an even further disruption to the economic system. 
While I believe that the Cyprus bail-in allowed the country 
gain a bail-out which saved the banks from turning insolvent, 
it was still a short term solution that may cause a long term 
problem.  Foreign investors will not want to enter Cyprus in 
longer knowing that their banks may be subject to regulations 
whereby their deposits, both insured and uninsured, are at risk 
of being lost if another economic crisis looms on the horizon. 
Standard for Using Deposits after a Bail-out 
Banking deposits under Article 17 require protection under 
a much higher standard.  When levying deposits in any 
27
5  PAUL ARTEMOU (DO NOT DELETE) 8/10/2016  9:53 AM 
232 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 28:1 
situation, including for obligations related to a bail-out, such 
obligation should only be permitted if the regulating body can 
‘sufficiently’ show that all reasonable options have been 
exhausted and there is no choice but to raise funds through the 
levying of bank deposits. Furthermore, if this standard is met, 
then that regulating body should only be able to take from 
uninsured deposits, and never from insured deposits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Cyprus bail-in was an unprecedented and largely 
unpopular regulation in the European Union’s response to the 
Cypriot economic crisis. The bail-in involved the Troika bailing 
out the country in return for Cyprus raising € 4.2 billion dollars 
through the restructuring of the two largest banks on the 
island, and the levying of uninsured bank deposits in those 
banks. 
It is clear that the rights of EU depositors have been 
altered as a result of the events of the Cyprus bail-out. Bank 
deposits are no longer completely safe from the negative effects 
of a financial crisis, especially in the EU. 
I believe that the levying of banks deposits by the Cypriot 
government was legal under Article 17 of the Charter because 
there was neither an improper deprivation of property nor a 
regulation by the government without regard to the general 
interest. Insured deposits in both banks were untouched 
satisfying the banks Cyprus’ deposit guarantee schemes. 
Furthermore, the uninsured deposits, although potentially 
subject to loss, are never guaranteed to be paid back in the 
event of a bank failure, meaning that there was no deprivation 
of property under Article 17. Also, the regulation that may 
eventually lead to losses in those deposits have followed the 
legal elements of Article 17. However, although the levying of 
bank deposits in Cyprus was legal under Article 17, I believe 
that the European Union should hold a higher standard to 
deposits under Article 17 because of the special nature of bank 
deposits and their importance to the EU economy as a whole. 
 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol28/iss1/5
